Aircraft loss of control (LOC) is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport airplane and operational classes, and can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of conditions and uncertainties, including multiple hazards, and their validation must provide a means of assessing system effectiveness and coverage of these hazards. This requires the definition of a comprehensive set of LOC test scenarios based on accident and incident data as well as future risks. This paper defines a comprehensive set of accidents and incidents over a recent 15 year period, and presents preliminary analysis results to identify worst-case combinations of causal and contributing factors (i.e., accident precursors) and how they sequence in time. Such analyses can provide insight in developing effective solutions for LOC, and form the basis for developing test scenarios that can be used in evaluating them. Preliminary findings based on the results of this paper indicate that system failures or malfunctions, crew actions or inactions, vehicle impairment conditions, and vehicle upsets contributed the most to accidents and fatalities, followed by inclement weather or atmospheric disturbances and poor visibility. Follow-on research will include finalizing the analysis through a team consensus process, defining future risks, and developing a comprehensive set of test scenarios with correlation to the accidents, incidents, and future risks. Since enhanced engineering simulations are required for batch and piloted evaluations under realistic LOC precursor conditions, these test scenarios can also serve as a high-level requirement for defining the engineering simulation enhancements needed for generating them.
I. Introduction
ircraft loss of control (LOC) is a leading cause of fatal accidents across all transport airplane and operational classes. 1, 2, 3 LOC can be described as motion that is:
 outside the normal operating flight envelopes; not predictably altered by routine pilot control inputs;  characterized by nonlinear effects, such as kinematic/inertial coupling;  disproportionately large responses to small state variable changes, or oscillatory/divergent behavior;  likely to result in high angular rates and displacements; and  characterized by the inability to maintain heading, altitude, and wings-level flight. 4 LOC is therefore fundamentally a dynamics and control problem, but there are many causal and contributing factors (or precursors) that can lead to LOC. 5, 6, 7 The primary causes include: entry into a vehicle upset condition; reduction or loss of control effectiveness; changes to the vehicle dynamic response in relation to handling/flying qualities; and combinations of these. There are numerous factors that have historically led or contributed to LOC. These can be grouped into three major categories: adverse onboard conditions, external hazards and disturbances, and abnormal vehicle dynamics and upset conditions. LOC causal and contributing factors within these categories are summarized in Fig. 1 . Adverse onboard conditions include vehicle problems (i.e., vehicle impairment, vehicle damage, or system failures) and inappropriate crew actions or inaction. External hazards and disturbances consist of inclement weather conditions, atmospheric disturbances, poor visibility, and obstacles (fixed and moving) that require abrupt maneuvering for avoidance. Examples of abnormal vehicle dynamics include oscillatory response, uncommanded motions, and non-intuitive control response. Upset conditions include a variety of off-nominal or extreme flight conditions and abnormal trajectories (e.g., abnormal attitude, uncontrolled descent, and stall / departure). The complexity of LOC is clearly illustrated in Fig. 1 , particularly considering that many LOC accidents involve combinations of the causal and contributing factors that are listed.
Solutions for LOC must therefore be developed to provide prevention and recovery capabilities under a wide variety of hazards (and their combinations) that can lead to LOC. 8, 9 One onboard system concept for accomplishing this is illustrated in Fig. 2 . The colors depicted in Fig. 2 are representative of the following functions: vehicle health state detection capabilities are indicated by green, vehicle flight safety state assessment and resilient guidance and control capabilities are shown in blue, crew-system interface information and support capabilities are shown in yellow, and onboard modeling capabilities are shaded in purple. The signals depicted in Fig. 2 represent vector quantities and are defined as follows: "x" is the vehicle state, "y" represents measurable outputs, "z" represents controlled variables (which can be mode-dependent), "u" represents control inputs (with subscript "p" denoting pilot input commands, and subscript "c" denoting control system commands), "n" represents noise signals, "f" represents failures (and in the case of jammed actuators, for example, can represent persistent asymmetric forces acting on the aircraft), and "d" represents external disturbances. These technologies may also be aimed at specific precursors that are shown to cause a significant proportion of accidents.
The validation of technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery, such as those illustrated in Fig. 2 , poses significant challenges. All LOC hazards and their combinations cannot be fully replicated in piloted simulation or flight test evaluations. However, the validation process must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies are effective and that they do no harm -i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks. Moreover, a means of assessing hazards coverage must also be included in the validation framework. • External hazards and disturbances:
-inclement weather & atmospheric disturbances » wind shear, turbulence, rain / thunderstorms, snow / icing, wake vortices -poor visibility (fog / haze, night) -obstacle (fixed or moving)
•
Abnormal dynamics & vehicle upsets:
-abnormal vehicle dynamics & control response -abnormal attitude, airspeed, angular rates, asymmetric forces, or flight trajectory -uncontrolled descent (including spiral dive) -stall/departure from controlled flight Generally, LOC is described as motion that is:
• outside normal envelopes
• not predictably altered by pilot control inputs
• characterized by nonlinear effects,
• disproportionately large responses to small state variable changes,
• oscillatory/divergent behavior
• likely to result in high angular rates / displacements,
• characterized by the inability to maintain heading, altitude, and wings-level flight
A validation framework involving analysis, simulation, and experimental testing was previously developed for safety-critical integrated systems operating under hazardous conditions that can lead to LOC, 10, 11 and a preliminary set of LOC test scenarios 12 was developed based on a limited accident set defined over a thirty year time period. The objectives of the current research are to define an extensive accident (and incident) set over a recent fifteen year time period, perform a thorough analysis of this accident / incident set based on a team consensus process, and develop a comprehensive set of test scenarios based on this analysis and an identified set of potential future risks. This paper presents preliminary results of this research. Specifically, this paper presents a set of 275 LOC accidents and incidents from 1996-2010, and preliminary analysis results to identify worst-case combinations of causal and contributing factors and how they sequence in time. Final analysis results and the set of LOC test scenarios, both based on a team consensus process, will be published separately. The test scenarios will be based on the analysis of accidents, incidents, and future risks, and will be developed for use in the validation of onboard systems technologies for LOC prevention and recovery. Since enhanced engineering simulations are required for batch and piloted evaluations under realistic LOC precursor conditions, these test scenarios can also serve as a high-level requirement for defining the simulation enhancements needed for generating realistic LOC test scenarios.
Section II defines the accident / incident set used in the analysis, and presents preliminary analysis results in terms of worst-case hazards combinations and how they sequence in time. Section III discusses a preliminary set of future potential risks that are relevant to LOC. Section IV discusses follow-on work, which includes finalizing the accident analysis results, finalizing the set of future risks, and developing a comprehensive set of LOC test scenarios based on the final accident / incident analysis and future risks. Section V provides a summary of the results of this paper and some concluding remarks. Appendix A provides the full set of accidents and incidents used in the analysis of Section II, and Appendix B presents LOC sequence diagrams resulting from the analysis.
II. Aircraft Loss-of-Control Accident / Incident Set and Preliminary Analysis
This section presents a detailed analysis of aircraft accidents and incidents (to be equivalently referred to as "events" in this paper). The primary accident / incident set will be categorized as LOC, but LOC-related accidents (e.g., resulting from control component failures and/or vehicle damage sufficient to alter vehicle dynamics and control characteristics) were also evaluated.
A. Accident / Incident Set Definition
Transport airplane loss-of-control events were reviewed for the fifteen year period 1996 through 2010. Only airplanes certified under Transport Category * or Commuter Category † were included. Only normal commercial or non-revenue flights were included, such as scheduled or non-scheduled passenger or cargo flights, positioning flights, or executive flights. Events that occurred during demonstration, military, training, or test flights were not considered, nor were owner-flown business jet operations.
Accident databases were searched using the terms: "loss-of-control," "upset," "unusual attitude," "stall," and "uncontrolled." ‡ The following databases were searched: Following identification from the databases, the accident / incident reports were reviewed using all available data. Where possible, the national investigative agency report was reviewed, even if that agency's database was not available for searching.
Each accident and incident is identified by ICAO (or FAA) operator code and flight number. If the flight number is not available, the last two characters of the aircraft registration will replace the flight number. If no operator code is available (i. e. non-airline flights), the full aircraft registration is used for identification.
A total of 275 accidents and incidents were identified resulting in 7185 onboard fatalities with an additional 235 ground fatalities. Forty-one percent happened at night and forty-three percent occurred during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). Table 1a shows a decreasing trend over the period. Table 1b shows the  distribution by aircraft class and Table 1c shows the distribution to type of operation. Table 1d shows the distribution of events over phases of flight.
The set of accidents and incidents is provided in Appendix A. 
B. Accident / Incident Statistics by Causal and Contributing Factors
A preliminary analysis was performed for the 275 accident / incident set defined above by dividing the set into subsets and allocating the subsets to the analysis team members. The initial step in the analysis consisted of a review of each event in the set. The level of detail in analyzing each accident and incident was therefore dependent on the level of detail provided in the accident and incident reports. Information from each report was transcribed into a categorized set of causal and contributing factors, using the categories and sub-categories defined in Fig. 1 . A basic statistical summary of the accident / incident set in terms of individual LOC precursors (i.e., causal and contributing factors) is provided in Table 2 . Table 2a summarizes the number of events and fatalities by precursor category and sub-category, and Tables 2b -2d provide these statistics for each individual precursor within each category and sub-category. It should be noted in Table 2 that the precursors are not mutually exclusive. For example, 240 LOC events involved one or more adverse onboard conditions, and the frequency of each sub-category within this category is listed. These numbers do not add up to 240, however, because there were many events involving more than one sub-category. Similarly, adding the number of accidents listed for the three categories exceeds the 275 total because many events involved multiple categories. The same is true for Tables 2b-2d for individual precursors. 
C. Worst-Case Precursor Combinations
A preliminary analysis of the accident / incident set in terms of worst-case combinations of causal and contributing factors (as defined by number of accidents and resulting fatalities), was determined using threedimensional scatter plots. The three dimensions are aligned with the three categories identified in Table 2 . Sphere size is directly proportional to the number of accidents, and sphere color depicts the number of fatalities as indicated by the legend. Figure 3 shows scatter plots by category and sub-category with and without within-category overlap. Fig. 3a shows worst-case precursor sub-category combinations and includes within-category overlap. For example, combinations involving system failures / malfunctions do not exclude cases that also involved inappropriate crew actions / inactions. Fig. 3b excludes within-category overlap. The team felt that excluding cases of multiple withincategory precursors resulted in unacceptable loss of information, so it was determined that the analysis should include this overlap. All remaining figures in this paper therefore include within-category overlap. As indicated by Fig. 3a , precursor combinations involving system failure / malfunction, inappropriate crew action / inaction, and vehicle upset conditions led to the highest number of fatalities both with and without involvement by inclement weather / atmospheric disturbance and poor visibility. Vehicle impairment with and without vehicle upsets also led to a high level of fatalities. These worst-case sub-category combinations can be further explored by generating scatter plots within these sub-categories. For example, Figure 4 shows a precursor level scatter plot to investigate the specific precursors that contributed to the "Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction" -"Poor Visibility" -"Vehicle Upset" combination of Figure 3a . As indicated in Figure 4b , the precursors that contributed to this sub-category combination were entirely "Loss of Attitude State Awareness" and "Loss of Energy State Awareness", predominantly at night, and leading primarily to abnormal trajectories, uncontrolled descent, and stall/departure. Additional worst-case precursor-level evaluations will be performed for the final analysis.
Figures 5a and 5b present scatter plots that separate non-fly-by-wire (non-FBW) and fly-by-wire (FBW) aircraft, respectively. Although there were only 24 accidents / incidents in the data set involving FBW aircraft, it is interesting to investigate as a separate group. The results for non-FBW aircraft are very similar to the full set. The FBW aircraft analysis identifies system failure / malfunction and vehicle impairment combined with vehicle upset as the worst-case sub-category combinations. 
D. Precursor Sequences
A preliminary analysis of precursor temporal ordering was completed to identify dominant precursors and worst case sequences for the accidents and incidents of Appendix A. Table 3a shows a summary of the sequential occurrences for each precursor category and sub-category, and Tables 3b -3d show sequence summaries for each precursor in each sub-category. As shown, up to seven precursors were identified on several events but most of the accidents and incidents had no more than five. Tables 3a-d indicate that LOC events were usually first precipitated by an adverse onboard condition and most often by a system or component failure or malfunction. The second precipitating factor occurring most often was an external hazard or disturbance and in that case usually related to weather or reduced visibility. Moreover, external hazards and disturbances rarely occurred further downstream than 2 nd in LOC sequences. Vehicle upsets were rarely the initial factor but rather an outcome of an external hazard/disturbance or adverse onboard condition.
Within "Adverse Onboard Conditions", inappropriate crew action / inaction and vehicle impairment were equally likely to be a precipitating factor but inappropriate crew action / inaction occurred as the second or third event in response to a precipitating factor. Adverse onboard conditions were also the most likely factor to occur second in temporal sequencing leading to aircraft LOC. Within this category inappropriate crew action / inaction was the most likely secondary factor to occur indicating crew response to some precipitating event. Vehicle impairment or system and component failure were equally likely to be the second factor where contaminated airfoil was the leading cause of impairment.
Within "External Hazards and Disturbances", the leading initial factor was snow / icing, followed by nearly equal occurrences of wind shear, turbulence, wake vortex, and thunderstorms. It is also noteworthy that external hazards or disturbances were most often a precipitating event. Vehicle upsets most often occurred as the second, third, or fourth factor in the LOC sequence indicating that multiple precursors can lead to an upset.
Tables 4a-c summarize the number of accidents and fatalities associated with each initiating precursor. Fig. B-2 shows that a vehicle upset is the most common result of inappropriate crew action/inaction occurring in at least 71% of events (30 of 42). Furthermore, a vehicle upset is a direct result of inappropriate crew action in at least 22 of the 30 events. The highest number of fatalities occurred with a vehicle upset (53%) following inappropriate crew response (34%).
Similarly, Fig. B-1 shows that a vehicle upset occurs as a result of system and components failures in at least 64% of the events but is much less often as a direct result of the failure or malfunction but more commonly preceded by inappropriate crew action/inaction. Following system and component failures, vehicle upset is involved in 75% of fatalities. Similar results are shown by events initiated by vehicle impairment (shown in Fig. B-3) where vehicle upset occurs in at least 63% of the events, inappropriate crew action occurs in 54% of events and vehicle upset is involved in 70% of fatalities.
The diagrams for events initiated by external hazards and disturbances are shown in Fig. B-4 through B-6. Figure B-4 indicates that there is no clearly dominant factor immediately following inclement weather as the initiating precursor. However a vehicle upset occurs in 69% (40 of 58) of events and inappropriate crew action in 60% (35 of 58) of events, similar to the discussion of adverse onboard conditions.
III. Preliminary Definition of Future Potential Risks
Future potential risks relevant to LOC must be considered in developing a comprehensive set of test scenarios that enable forward-looking mitigation to emerging and future hazards. An initial set of future risks based on current trends is provided in Table 5 , based on previous work (see Ref. 12 ). 
IV. Future Research: Aircraft Loss-of-Control Test Scenarios
Future research will include: 1.) finalizing the accident / incident set; 2.) performing an analysis of the accident / incident set using a team consensus process; 3.) defining future risks that utilize all available sources of information as determined by CAST, the FAA and ICAO, and others in the aviation community; and 4.) developing a comprehensive set of LOC test scenarios based on the final analysis of accidents, incidents and future potential risks. The test scenarios will include adverse vehicle conditions, inappropriate crew actions / inaction, external hazards and disturbances, and abnormal vehicle dynamics and upset conditions occurring as single precursors and combined as multiple precursor events. The test scenarios will also include recommended evaluation methods, and flight conditions. An example scenario format is given below in Table 6 based on previous work (see Ref. 12 ).
Table 6. Potential format for LOC test scenarios.
A full set of test scenarios developed through team consensus will be published in a later paper, including a correlation of the scenarios to the accidents, incidents, and future risks defined in the final analysis results. 
V. Conclusion
This paper presents preliminary analysis results for a set of 275 accidents and incidents that occurred over the period 1996-2010 and involving aircraft at and above 12,500 lbs. Statistics for this set are provided in terms of each five-year period, aircraft type, operational type, and phase of flight. The analysis was performed by subsets allocated to the team, and consisted of determining individual precursor contributions to accidents and fatalities, identifying worst-case precursor combinations, and determining the temporal sequencing of precursors leading to LOC accidents and incidents from the set. Preliminary findings based on the results of this paper indicate that system failures or malfunctions, crew actions or inactions, vehicle impairment conditions, and vehicle upsets contribute the most to accidents and fatalities, followed by inclement weather or atmospheric disturbances and poor visibility. Individual precursors that contributed most to the accidents and fatalities in the analyzed set came from the System Failures / Malfunctions, Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction, and Vehicle Upset sub-categories. Other key contributors included Vehicle Impairment, Inclement Weather and Atmospheric Disturbances, and Abnormal Vehicle Dynamics. Worst-case precursor combinations (in terms of number of accidents and fatalities) were dominated by System & Component Failures / Malfunctions, Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction, and Vehicle Upset Conditions, with contributions from the Weather & Atmospheric Disturbance and Poor Visibility subcategories. The next worst-case combination involved Vehicle Impairment with and without Vehicle Upsets. Further examination of the worst-case combination of Inappropriate Crew Action / Inaction -Poor VisibilityVehicle Upset revealed that the underlying precursors consisted entirely of Loss of Attitude and Energy State Awareness, occurred predominantly at night, and led primarily to abnormal trajectories, uncontrolled descent, and stall/departure. Additional worst-case precursor-level evaluations will be performed for the final analysis. The preliminary worst-case analysis of FBW aircraft indicated that System Failures / Malfunctions and Vehicle Impairment combined with Vehicle Upsets were the largest contributors to accidents and fatalities. Analysis of temporal sequencing indicated that LOC events were usually precipitated by an adverse onboard condition, and most often by a system failure or malfunction, or by an external hazard or disturbance, usually due to weather or poor visibility. Vehicle upsets most often occurred as the second, third, or fourth factor in the LOC sequence indicating that multiple precursors can lead to an upset. Evaluation of sequence diagrams of Appendix B indicated that vehicle upset occurred as a result of system and components failures in at least 64% of the events evaluated, but was much less often as a direct result of the failure or malfunction but more commonly preceded by inappropriate crew action/inaction. Following system and component failures, vehicle upset was involved in 75% of fatalities. Similar results were shown by events initiated by vehicle impairment. Furthermore, a vehicle upset is a direct result of inappropriate crew action in at least 22 of the 30 events. The highest number of fatalities occurred with a vehicle upset (53%) following inappropriate crew response (34%). The diagrams for events initiated by external hazards and disturbances indicate that there is no clearly dominant factor immediately following inclement weather as the initiating precursor. However a vehicle upset occurs in 69% (40 of 58) of events and inappropriate crew action in 60% (35 of 58) of events, similar to that previously discussed as a result of adverse onboard conditions. Follow-on research will involve re-evaluating the accident / incident set using a consensus process to ensure consistency, defining a set of future LOC-related risks, and generating a comprehensive set of LOC test scenarios based on the final accident / incident analysis and future risks. The analysis results and test scenarios resulting from this research can be used in the development and evaluation of technology solutions, such as onboard systems, that provide improved LOC prevention and recovery capabilities. Wider application of this research to broader LOC solutions is also envisioned. 
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